The blast radius is narrower than the technique suggests however. There is no remote component, so the attacker must be physically at the keyboard and know the right combination of keys. The machine must also have at least one account linked to an online Microsoft account, because the reset flow that anchors the attack depends on it.

Devices running only local accounts are not affected.

  • frongt@lemmy.zip
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    4 hours ago

    The lock screen is not really a security boundary. It’s a convenience at best. Once a system is booted into windows, it’s running all kinds of services that are exploitable over the network, too. And if you can log on as another user, you can exploit local services.

    If you want to protect a system, enable full disk encryption with a strong password and shut it down. (Assuming there aren’t other vulnerabilities in bitlocker, again.)

    • folekaule@lemmy.world
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      3 hours ago

      I was just pointing out what relevance Bitlocker (a disk encryption system) had to do with anything. It’s mentioned in the article.

      I’m not a security expert, but I presume that when that level is security is required, it would be possible to build such a system that does do a complete lockdown when the screen is locked. That wasn’t the subject of my comment, though.

    • orbituary@lemmy.dbzer0.com
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      3 hours ago

      This is like saying “if you want to have safe sex, put a condom on and never have sex.”

      Devices should have ACLs in place at the file system level, be encrypted without proper credentials, and deny access from unspecified locations.

      Deny all and allow only what’s specified.