When you spin up a fresh public Linux instance, automated scanners start knocking on your doors within milliseconds.
It doesn’t take much to get locked down properly, but missing a few basics can leave you exposed.
I’ve put together a straightforward guide covering the essential hardening steps from UFW and SSH key-only auth to secure Docker bindings and automated maintenance.
Original content by The Unknown Universe, written by a human and not AI generated!
I really appreciate the effort but… how to say it?.. it might be useful to make sure you understand a topic before trying to teach it to others :)
Some notes:
Create a Non-Root Administrative User
Not as important as most people think (local privilege escalation is a thing, and it’s also quite easy for your user to alias sudo to something that will capture your password the next time you type it).
Basically: if an hostile actor gets a shell on your server, you are fucked anyway.
sudo usermod -aG docker your_username
This is the same as being root. Yep, the very same thing you went that whole length to avoid :)
Automate Maintenance with a System Update Script
Look into unattended upgrades. Also… it’s not automation if you have to run a script manually :)
Not today, satan.
Passwordless root allows you to require another factor of authentication on the off chance you didn’t set up key only ssh login like the top of the guide says. That second factor is the administrator account name. Now you can make this as generic as you want but assuming your non root admin account isn’t named “administrator” or “admin” then you just increased the security of your system.
Suggesting that because privilege escalation exists there is no difference between a user and root is absurd on the face of it. Privesc requires vulnerable versions of vulnerable packages with the specific circumstances present that allow pre and post exploitation actions. In case you were operating under the assumption that most privesc goes from local administrator to root, usually you’re going from some relatively unprivileged user account that handles a service up to root and that’s harder than just invoking sudo.
You would still want to roll over your credentials and restore from backups but “safe cracking tools exist so just leave the cash register deposits in plain view on a shelf behind the desk” isn’t a strong argument for password root.
No root but then they use sudo? That’s going out from the frying pan into the fire.
Of course privilege escalation exists, but why roll out the red carpet on an attacker that managed to get shell access? Maybe in the time that they take to figure out that privilege escalation you have the time to detect the attack and defend against them
If someone put a script on your server that tried to do privilege escalation you should just assume it was successful and act accordingly. It doesn’t really change what should happen.
replacing or reimaging it automatically when you see something like this feels like overkill.
More Docker hardening*
Consider rootless docker or Podman. If that is not for you:
- enable usernamespace remapping
- default-drop all container capabilities, then selectively and restrictively add them in (needs trial and error)
- limit container privileges:
security_opt: - no-new-privileges:true - limit your containers’ access to system resources such as memory, cpu, etc.
- if possible: set the container filesytem to read-only. The same can be done for data in volumes.
* Note that these tips are less “fire-and-forget, sane defaults” and can be much more finicky. Whether they work well depends on the service in question. They may break container deployments and are often a matter of trial and error until you get them just right. (Feel free to hit me up on details; if I happen to be running the same services as you are, I may be able to tell you what works and what doesn’t.)
sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade -y
should be
sudo apt update && sudo apt full-upgrade -yalso for
echo “PASTE_YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY_HERE” | ssh your_username@your_server_ip “mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys”
why not just use
ssh-copy-id?edit: added more thoughts
You’re completely right on both counts, full-upgrade handles dependency shifts properly without leaving packages held back, and ssh-copy-id is much cleaner. Updated the guide to reflect both.
I love ssh-copy-id, but end up doing it manually about half the time anyway. I’ve tried integrating it into build scripts and find what the op did more reliable.
Could just be me though… it is Linux, and there a dozen ways to skin Linus. We all have our assholes and opinions.
I’ve tried integrating it into build scripts In a script I would also write out all the commands I want to run. After all, ssh-copy-id is a shell script itself. For instructions for someone to run interactively, I think ssh-copy-id makes the most sense.
Good guide as a base. Few thought…
I’d use unattended-upgrades instead of the script. A long know mehod and does similar, and the script doesn’t reboot for a kernel CVE. I’d pair it alongside out-of-band console and an uptime check.
Fail2ban needs rsyslog enabled (or proper logging) or it silently reads nothing.
And lastly Journald needs retention set, or you can loose logs in reboots.
Also I’m not sure if ‘core’ is enough anymore for a public operating and accessed server, but it’s absolutely vital as a start.






