[ Cisheterosexual | He/Him | 24 yo | ES/EN | Venezuelan | ADHD, autism and bipolar disorder | agnostic atheist ]
I’m just a random weeb. I love anime, dubstep, science, philosophy, logic and tech all along.
PS: English isn’t my native language, so sorry if I mispell some things, please kindly point it to me.
That “it’s not going away” attitude is the fucking problem…
We should fucking fight it, either by good or by bad, because that defeatism is what they want, they want us to think that TINA, then, little by little, force ourselves to do things that at first would seem unacceptable to us.
That’s fucking tivoization
Age gating is bad itself.
Don’t forget that’s “macOS inspired”.
Meanwhile actually good distros are drowning at the bottom of the ocean.
createPost() in increasingly erratic ways)Well, it’s not that I’m telling another thing than the truth.
You’re attacking something totally unrelated and that I’ve never mentioned (“Linux 2.0”) because you simply can’t deny that LLM are bug-making machinegunss.
Literature on that in my response.
If you don’t have anything better to say than an ad hominem fallacy and a red herring fallacy, then you’re totally discrediting yourself.
Although that’s basically true…
No, pragmatically speaking, LLMs and in general AI will only make code worse each day.
LLMs are a great tool for create bugs *
Fuck Linus.
No, he gets them for being wrong.
As another person stated in another comment, that’s a false equivalence fallacy, but not only that, it’s a false dilemma fallacy, and a strawman fallacy.
LLM code can cause deaths (i.e. in hospital software), or otherwise great human or material loses (i.e., bank software or a shelter’s software), or even cultural loses (it actually does them right now, but you can also think about i.e. a museum software).
They can only make fallacies to defend themselves.
Handing third-party extensions blanket permissions to inspect and modify live plaintext traffic across all tabs creates a massive MITM exfiltration surface. Moving rule matching to declarativeNetRequest enforces least privilege by executing filters in the native engine without exposing sensitive network payloads to extension code.
You’re doing a false equivalence here.
It’s not about blanket permission vs. almost no permissions.
You can have granular ACLs (which are being hindered by MV3), or OCap/CapSec, or even other security and permissions approaches.
They’re or incompetent or malevolous, these are the only two options left when you think a bit about it.
webRequestBlocking is not deleted in MV3. The synchronous blocking engine still exists in Chromium. If an extension is installed via local policy or the Windows Registry (ExtensionInstallForcelist), full programmatic webRequestBlocking executes in Manifest V3 just as it did in MV2.
It is in practice.
Not all users are able to do that (local policy install), as not all users are (or have to be) that tech savvy. That’s an exclusionary barrier towards inclusion and accesibility of security and sovereignity features.
Not all users are able to do that, as not all users are (or have to be) that tech savvy. That’s an exclusionary barrier towards inclusion and accesibility of security and sovereignity features.
Blaming process isolation and IPC for memory bugs like Use-After-Free and dangling pointers fundamentally confuses language-level C++ problems with OS containment architecture. Memory corruption exists across all C++ engines (Gecko, WebKit, Blink); isolation is what prevents those bugs from compromising the host OS.
Yeah, but they instead greatly compromise the browser, and the problem is that these are not as likely to happen in MV2 (i.e., Firefox).
Why? Simple:
The problem is, if an attacker and/or a malicious process do compromise that unreferenced or unallocated memory, then any and all sandboxing will be esentially irrelevant and thus vulnerated, vulnerating not only the browser (something that itself can compromise sensible information), but even the OS.
Then you have the zombie processes because the current memory model in V8 causes SWs to forcedly stop before they can do any cleanup.
MV3 is not about security at all, is about more control over your own computer and about more control over the network (that way they can let more trackers, zero-days, ads, malvertisers and even malware to pass because browser-level blockers and firewalls won’t be able to block them).
Edit: MV3 is a perfect example of inverse tivoization.
No, they’re intrinsically less secure.
They generate memory issues (use-after-free, dangling pointers, double free(), zombie processes, uncomplete teardown, GC failures or abrupt stops, race conditions, etc.) because of their shitty isolation, and their poor service-workers and IPC architecture.
What’s worse, they greatly limit the network APIs needed to active defense (DNR instead of webRequest).
Hell naw, that’s an arbitrary take. There’s no “child things” or “adult things”, nor “male things” or “female things”, just things, and the “male”/“female”/“child”/“adult” is an arbitary tag we put on them.
And even if there are some things that aren’t so good for the child to see, the only correct way to address that is educating them, guiding them, listening to them and, over all, treating them as humans, the “we need to block this to children” is totally adultist.